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THE BACKGROUND OF THE THEORY OF DISCOVERY 
Dieter Dörr∗ 
I. Introduction 
In his excellent book Conquest by Law,1 Lindsay Robertson explained 
the importance of the theory of discovery in the westward expansion of the 
United States. As seen with the famous 1823 Supreme Court decision 
Johnson v. M’Intosh,2 the first of the so-called Marshall trilogy,3 this theory 
would be used to deprive Indians of their land. In this decision, Chief 
Justice Marshall stated:  
They [Indians] were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the 
soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, 
and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to 
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own 
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original 
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to 
those who made it.4  
President Andrew Jackson would later misuse these words to dispossess 
the Indian Nations of their land without their consent. Once the Indian 
removal policy had begun, Marshall attempted to close the Pandora’s Box 
M’Intosh opened with the subsequent decisions Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia5 and Worcester v. Georgia,6 eight and nine years later, 
respectively. 
Andrew Jackson became the seventh president of the United States on 
March 4, 1829.7 He was a strong supporter of the Indian removal policy, 
the first step being the removal of the eastern tribes o lands west of the 
                                                                                                                 
 ∗ Dr. iur., Professor of Public Law, International and European Law, Media Law, 
Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. 
 1. LINDSAY ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA 
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005). 
 2. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 3. The trilogy also includes Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 4. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574. 
 5. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1. 
 6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515. 
 7. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 126. 
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Mississippi.8 On May 26, 1830 the Removal Act passed the House and the 
Senate, and was signed into law by President Jackson shortly after.9 Chief 
Justice Marshall was shocked because the Act was based on the legal theory 
of discovery he developed in M’Intosh.10 He tried to reformulate this 
discovery theory in 1831, when he stated in Cherokee Nation that “the 
Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, 
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be 
extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government . . . .”11 In 
Worcester v. Georgia, 1832, he declared that discovery gave only “the 
exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to 
sell.”12  
But it was too late as the majority in the Supreme Court was changing 
dramatically. In the year 1831 President Jackson appointed two new judges 
who supported the removal policy, John McLean of Ohio and Henry 
Baldwin of Pennsylvania.13 Worcester was the Marshall Court’s last chance 
to reformulate the discovery doctrine. After this decision, Justice William 
Johnson died in 1834 and in January 1835 Jackson appointed James M. 
Wayne of Georgia in his place, another vigorous supporter of removal.14 
Justice Gabriel Duvall, a Marshall supporter, resigned.15 Chief Justice 
Marshall still possessed his intellectual power but his physical strength was 
manifestly on decline; He died on July 6, 1835.16 Thereafter the 
Jacksonians used their new majority to restore the M’Intosh discovery 
formulation. 
In 1836 President Jackson appointed Philip P. Barbour of Virginia and 
Roger B. Taney of Maryland to the seats vacated by Duvall and Marshall.17 
In 1837 the Court increased to nine members.18 Jackson appointed John 
Catron of Tennessee to the first seat.19 His chosen successor and former 
Vice President, Van Buren, appointed John McKinley of Alabama to the 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. at 125. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 129. 
 11. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
 12. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 545 (1832). 
 13. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 131. 
 14. Id. at 138. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 140.  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol38/iss2/3
No. 2] BACKGROUND OF THE THEORY OF DISCOVERY 479 
 
 
second seat.20 The Court comprised seven Jacksonian members post-1837, 
only Joseph Story and Smith Thomson remained from the Marshall Court.21  
In the decisions following Worcester, the Jacksonians used the theory of 
discovery to argue “Indian tribes in the new world were regarded as mere 
temporary occupants of the soil, and the absolute rights of property and 
dominion were held to belong to the European nation by which any 
particular portion of the country was first discovered.”22 The result was, in 
the formulation of Lindsay Robertson, conquest by law.23 But what is the 
background of the theory of discovery? Is Chief Justice Marshall’s 
interpretation of the theory in Johnson v. M’Intosh valid? To answer these 
questions it is necessary to examine the theory’s origins.  
The legal concept of discovery has two different roots: the idea of the 
Christian-European family and the idea of civilization. Before the great 
discoveries in the fifteenth century, legal relations between the various 
communities were conducted within a relatively fixed framework. The 
Christian empires in Europe formed the core of this exchange, with 
pluralistic legal relationships amongst themselves. These Christian-
European empires coexisted side by side with Islamic empires. Legal 
interaction between these two spheres in the Middle Ages was regulated in 
a special way involving a large number of restrictions and prohibitions. The 
Greek-Byzantine cultural orbit represented the link between these two 
spheres; however, it was excluded from the tighter-knit community of 
Christian-European states and developed its own international law shaped 
by Constantinople.24 
Following the great discoveries, the range of action of the Europeans 
rapidly expanded to cover the entire globe. This raised the question as to 
which legal rules should apply to the relations between the overseas 
communities and the European states. The first problem that arises is 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409 (1842); see also United States v. 
Fernandez, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 303, 309 (1836); Mitchel v. United States (Mitchel I), 34 U.S. 
(9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835); Mitchel v. United States (Mitchel II), 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 52, 89 
(1841). 
 23. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 143-44.  
 24. See generally WILHELM G. GREWE, EPOCHEN DER VÖLKERRECHTSGESCHICHTE 72-82 
(1984) [hereinafter GREWE, EPOCHEN]; GEORG STADTMÜLLER, GESCHICHTE DES 
VÖLKERRECHTS: TEIL 1, UP TO THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA (1815) 54-55 (1951); STEFAN 
VEROSTA & KARL ZEMANEK, Die Geschichte des Völkerrechts, in VÖLKERRECHT VON 
ALFRED VERDROSS 31, 58-59 (5th ed. 1964); Karl-Heinz Ziegler, Zur Einführung: 
Völkerrechtsgeschichte, in 27 JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG [JUS] 350, 352-53 (1987). 
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whether these relations are governed by international law. It is questionable 
whether the various forms of politically organized structures overseas, 
ranging from large, rigidly structured empires to loose tribal organizations, 
could be recognized as entities in international law, or whether, in view of 
their lack of Christianity — or in later years lack of civilization — their 
ability to act as legal entities should be denied. 
II. The Doctrine of Discovery and the Idea of the Christian-European 
Family 
A. The Role of the Pope 
At the forefront of the doctrine of discovery is the idea of the Christian-
European family of peoples. Thus, in the first Papal Bulls of 1344,25 1436,26 
and 1455,27 referring to overseas territories, any rights of indigenous 
populations or communities in those overseas territories are totally denied. 
Furthermore, the Pope granted Spain and Portugal the right of conquest 
over any such territories.28 The enfeoffment formula brings together these 
various aspects in granting the Portuguese kings the exclusive rights to 
wage war; to subordinate and appropriate the wealth and possessions of the 
Saracens, heathens, and other enemies of Christ; and to take their 
inhabitants into eternal slavery.29 The Christian peoples as the discovering 
state had the right to take their lands. 
B. The Spanish Late Scholastic School 
The first important dispute on the rights of overseas peoples and 
communities arose in connection with the activities of the Spanish in the 
New World. After it became known that the Spanish had smashed the Aztec 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Bull of Nov. 28, 1344, reprinted in Alfonso García Gallo, Las Bulas de Alejandro 
VI y el ordenamiento jurídico de la expansión portuguesa y castellana en África y Indias, in 
27-28 INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTUDIOS JURIDICOS, ANUARIO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO 
ESPAÑOL 738-39 (1957-58). 
 26. Bull Romanus Pontifex of Sept. 15, 1436, reprinted in Charles Martial De Witte, 
Les Bulles Pontificales et l'Expansion Portugaise au XVe Siècle, in 48 REVUE D’HISTOIRE 
ECCLÉSIASTIQUE 683, 717-18 (Roger Aubert et al. eds., 1967). 
 27. Bull Romanus Pontifex of Jan. 8, 1455, reprinted in EUROPEAN TREATIES BEARING 
ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES TO 1648, at 9-26 (Frances 
Gardiner Davenfort ed., 1917).  
 28. Id.  
 29. JÖRG FISCH, DIE EUROPÄISCHE EXPANSION UND DAS VÖLKERRECHT 206-09 (1984).  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol38/iss2/3
No. 2] BACKGROUND OF THE THEORY OF DISCOVERY 481 
 
 
Empire with brutal ruthlessness, a broad opposition movement grew within 
the Spanish church.30 
Though their contributions have been largely overlooked, the works of 
the Spanish Late Scholastic School paved the way for the rise of modern 
international law. The first central figure in the discussion was Vitoria, who 
made an impressive attempt to systematically analyze and find a solution to 
relevant questions in his lecture "De Indis," likely given around 1532.31 
Vitoria (1483-1546) acknowledged that the recently discovered Indians, 
i.e., the Central American Indians, had rights of sovereignty and 
possession.32 In his view, they were the legal owners and occupiers of the 
land.33 Spain could neither derive title to Indian land through the Emperor 
nor the Pope.34 The Emperor was not lord of the world,35 and the Pope's 
authority extended only over Christendom, so accordingly he could not rule 
over any territories of heathens.36 Even the right of discovery did not give 
Spain any legitimate title over the existing Indian empires.37 Whilst non-
sovereign territory could be claimed by the first person to discover it, the 
American territories were not non-sovereign, but instead populated by 
peoples who had the rights of sovereignty and possession.38 Even the 
refusal of the Indians to accept Christianity did not give the Christians any 
rights of conquest or justification to wage war.39  
Suárez (1548-1617), who along with Vitoria is probably the most 
significant member of the Spanish Late Scholastic School, deemed the 
Indian empires to have the same rights as those of Christian empires.40 In 
his treatise, he places particularly clear stress upon the ideal of the equality 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 210-12.  
 31. See FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE INDIS RECENTER INVENTIS, ET DE JURE BELLI 
HISPANORUM IN BARBAROS: RELECTIONES (Walter Schätzel trans., 1952) (1539) (lectures on 
recently discovered Indians and the right of the Spanish to wage war against the barbarians); 
see also FISCH, supra note 29, at 212-13.  
 32. VITORIA, supra note 31, at 45.  
 33. Id.  
 34. See id. at 51-69. 
 35. Id. at 51. 
 36. See id. at 59-69.  
 37. Id. at 69. 
 38. Id.  
 39. See id. at 69-83. 
 40. See JOSEF SODER, FRANCISCO SUÁREZ UND DAS VÖLKERRECHT: GRUNDGEDANKEN ZU 
STAAT, RECHT UND INTERNATIONALEN BEZIEHUNGEN (1973) (on the importance of Suárez to 
modern international law); see also FISCH, supra note 29, at 224-25. 
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of all peoples.41 Accordingly, in the work of both Vitoria and Suárez, 
international law is claimed to have universal application and encompass all 
communities under its jurisdiction.42  
However, Vitoria and Suarez do allow Christian empires special rights: if 
the spreading of the gospel is hindered, or if a non-believing ruler forbids 
his subjects to convert to Christianity, then war may be waged against the 
non-believers.43 This does not contradict their condemnation of waging war 
against non-believing Indians. Suarez and Vitoria justify war on the 
grounds that the Christian mission is being prevented by force, not the 
Indians refusal to convert to Christianity.44 Both men thus proceeded from 
the premise that international law should allow non-believers to accept the 
Christian mission freely, without restraint.45  
Of particular importance to this debate is Vazquez de Menchaca (1512-
1569), who came from outside the ecclesiastical sphere and dealt with the 
question of overseas territories as early as 1564 in his “Controversiae 
Illustres.”46 He emphatically rejected the concept of special rights of 
Christian and civilized societies, because he regarded all men as born free.47 
Vazquez is a predecessor of Christian Wolff, to the extent that the concepts 
of the Late Scholastic School were transmitted through his works to the 
                                                                                                                 
 41. 23 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, TRACTUS TERTIUS DE CARITATE: OPERA OMNIA 747-48 
(1858).  
 42. For this reason Vitoria, Suárez, and possibly also Vásquez de Menchaca, deserve the 
honorary title of "Founders of International Law" much more than Hugo Grotius. On the 
discussion of Hugo Grotius as the “Founder of International Law," see generally CHRISTOPH 
LINK, HUGO GROTIUS ALS STAATSDENKER (1983); see also PETER HAGGENMACHER, GROTIUS 
ET LA DOCTRINE DE LA GUERRE JUSTE 622 (1983); Wilhelm G. Grewe, Grotius – Vater des 
Völkerrechts?, 23 DER STAAT 161 (1984); Hartmut Schiedermair, Hugo Grotius und die 
Naturrechtsschule, in EINIGKEIT UND RECHT UND FREIHEIT, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL 
CARSTENS 477 (Bodo Börner et al. eds., 1st ed. 1984); cf. Karl-Heinz Ziegler, Hugo Grotius 
als “Vater des Völkerrechts,” in GEDÄCHTNISSCHRIFT WOLFGANG MARTENS 851, 856 (1987) 
[hereinafter Ziegler, Hugo Grotius] (Grotius remains preeminent, but the importance of the 
Late Scholastic School is rightly emphasized). 
 43. See VITORIA, supra note 31, at 105-09; see also FISCH, supra note 29, at 217-19, 
224. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Dieter Dörr, Die "Indian Nations and Tribes" in Nordamerika und das 
Völkerrecht, 36 JAHRBUCH DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART [JÖR] 489, 491 
(1987); see also FISCH, supra note 29, at 217-18. 
 46. See KURT SEELMANN, DIE LEHRE DES FERNANDO VAZQUEZ DE MENCHACA VOM 
DOMINIUM (1979); see also FISCH, supra note 29, at 243-44. 
 47. 1 FERNANDO VÁSQUEZ DE MENCHACA, CONTROVERSIAS FUNDAMENTALES Y OTRAS 
DE MÁS FREQUENTE 4-5 (Fidel Rodriguez Alcalde ed., 1931). 
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Dutch University of Leiden, influencing, amongst others, Hugo Grotius 
(1583-1645), who is frequently, but misguidedly, referred to as the “father 
of (modern) international law.”48 
Already in the eighteenth century and especially in the nineteenth 
century, "Christendom" lost its importance as the central community of 
international law. Thus, from 1815 onward there is no longer any reference 
to Christianity as a central principle in the major international treaties.49  
C. Christian Wolff and the Idea of the State as a Legal Order 
It is therefore not surprising that the idea of the equality of all peoples 
became more consistently represented with the abandonment, or at least 
weakening, of the idea of the Christian-European family of peoples. Of 
particular importance to this process was Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and 
his rejection of all special rights of Christian, European and civilized 
societies in relation to overseas communities and peoples.50 In his view, 
only non-sovereign territories could be occupied by the discovering state.51 
Non-sovereign, by his definition, included only those territories not already 
taken into possession by a people.52 A precondition of the concept of a 
people is that the members of the group have associated with one another in 
a civil state.53 In Wolff's view, very loose forms of organization are 
sufficient for this; all that is necessary is an association of people organized 
around a legal order, even if unwritten.54 It is irrelevant whether the people 
are nomads or settled.55 Wolff describes the "people" as a legal state, and 
thus refers back to an old philosophical tradition: it is not the state, but the 
people as a community organized within a legal framework that is the 
essential bearer of sovereignty in international law.56 
  
                                                                                                                 
 48. See Ziegler, Hugo Grotius, supra note 42, at 851.  
 49. See GREWE, EPOCHEN, supra note 24, at 520. 
 50. See FISCH, supra note 29, at 270-75. 
 51. Id. at 273. 
 52. Id. 
 53. E.g., 2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS NATURALE METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM ¶¶ 
175-197 (Hildesheim 1968) (1742). 
 54. FISCH, supra note 29, at 273. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Stefan Verosta, Der Vertrag zwischen Portugal und dem Marathen-Staat von 1779 - 
europäisches oder universelles Völkerrecht, in FESTGABE FÜR WOLFGANG PREISER 95 
(1983). 
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III. The Concept of Civilization 
A. The Idea of Civilization 
Despite the work of the Late Scholastic School, the theory of 
fundamental equality of all peoples did not prevail in the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Rather, the concept of a community of “civilized” 
states was developed. Under this concept, the rights of the overseas 
communities to act in a legal capacity were increasingly denied. The 
majority of articles dealing with this relate to North America because the 
position of some Native communities was very powerful, something not 
realized today in Europe for the most part. For example, the Iroquois 
Federation was a major power, which made alliances with the competing 
powers of Britain and France.57 Several British and American historians are 
of the opinion that the Iroquois Federation had a decisive and lasting 
influence on the struggle for predominance between Britain and France.58 
B. Vattel and the Theory of Benefit of Mankind 
A theory that highlighted the lack of rights of the overseas territories and 
the community of civilized states can largely be traced back to the Swiss 
scholar Emer de Vattel (1714-1767), the greatest opponent of Wolff.59 
Initially, Vattel shared Wolff’s views on virtually every point, but a big 
difference manifested itself in the civilization concept.60  
Vattel developed the theory of benefit of mankind, primarily intended to 
justify the actions of Great Britain in North America.61 In accordance with 
this theory, people had the right to appropriate land for themselves only for 
the benefit derived, and could not prevent others from gaining benefit from 
the same land.62 In Vattel’s view, land must be divided up according to 
need.63 This gives the closely settled civilized peoples the natural right to 
appropriate the land of nomads, because these are very wasteful with the 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See generally FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE (1984). 
 58. See, e.g, id.; see also FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 416-24 
(Univ. of N.M. photo. reprint 1971) (1942). On the unwritten constitution of the Iroquois 
Federation, see Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Mrs. Parker (Mar. 20, 1751), in HENRY C. 
DENNIS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN 1492-1976, at 14 (1977).   
 59. See, e.g., FISCH, supra note 29, at 274-75. 
 60. 1 EMER DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE 
APPLIQUÉS À LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS 1-16, 18, 81, 
208-09 (Albert de Lapradelle ed., 1916). 
 61. Id. at 1, 18, 209. 
 62. Id. at 1, 18, 208. 
 63. Id. 
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land and do not utilize it effectively.64 Vattel developed a ladder of 
civilization: those who do not build on the land and instead live off the 
environment, like the old Germanic tribes and some Tartars, deserved to be 
exterminated like wild animals.65  
A portion of the land of nomadic peoples, the North American Indians 
among them, may be taken away for settled peoples in order to better utilize 
the land in the interest of humanity as a whole.66 Vattel described Indians as 
“savages” and deemed the Europeans to have the right to restrict these 
“savages” to more confined boundaries.67 In his opinion, the consent of the 
savages to the loss of land, e.g., through treaties, was certainly desirable, 
but not required by international law.68 
C. Civilization and the Doctrine of Terra Nullius 
It is only a small step from the theory of benefit to mankind to the 
concept of the community of civilized nations of the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.69 Under this theory, the international law community 
is equated with the civilized community. This is not a major divergence 
from Wolff, who described the “people” as a legal state, thus ascribing it a 
certain concept of civilization; however, the proponents of the doctrine of 
the community of civilized nations regarded all non-European people per se 
as uncivilized, regarding only the European states, and later the United 
States, as belonging to the civilized nations.70  
The essence of the concept of civilization within this context 
approximates only very imprecisely to the German word “Zivilisation,” 
compared to the English and French word “civilization” or “civilisation” 
which refers both to the culture and to the technical-industrial 
achievements. The English term is very closely linked with technical-
industrial progress. As a result of the alleged lack of technical-industrial 
achievement, the indigenous peoples in America, Africa, Asia and 
especially Australia were deemed not to have any civilization. 
Consequently, since they had no legal status, any actions against them 
could not be considered a violation of international law. John Stuart Mill 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. at 1, 7, 81. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1, 18, 209. 
 69. See FISCH, supra note 29, at 349-79; see also GREWE, EPOCHEN, supra note 24, at 
638-46. 
 70. See FISCH, supra note 29, at 349-79. 
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evoked this doctrine when he wrote about barbarians and their lack of rights 
as a nation.71 
Under the civilization doctrine, all overseas territories could be freely 
occupied by the discoverer state, as they are non-sovereign territories in 
international law. This doctrine is based on false assumptions about the 
indigenous peoples of America, Africa and Asia, who were regarded simply 
as nomadic hunters, living freely and independently outside any form of 
community. This applied particularly to North America, with Rousseau,72 
Tocqueville,73 Cooper,74 and later Thoreau75 making significant 
contributions with their image of the “noble savage.” This rapidly dissolved 
into “barbarian” and later the “red devil.”76 These images continue to shape 
conceptions of indigenous peoples, particularly in North America.  
Although the doctrine of the community of civilized nations, which 
excluded the non-European communities, was based on false premises, it 
was regarded as the basis of international law. Especially in Australia, the 
idea of civilized nations and the concept of terra nullius were used to justify 
the occupation of the land of the aborigines. Terra nullius was borne of the 
theory that land was ownerless and, thus, the discovering state was allowed 
to occupy the land. Because courts in Australia denied any civilization of 
the aborigines, the land in Australia is argued to be terra nullius.  
In the year 1833 the Supreme Court of New South Wales described the 
aborigines as “wandering tribes,” “living without certain habitation and 
without laws,” who “were never in the situation of conquered people.”77 In 
the 1889 decision Cooper v Stuart, Lord Watson stated: 
There is a great difference between the case of a Colony 
acquired by conquest or cession, in which there is an established 
system of law, and that of a Colony which consisted of a tract of 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See 4 JOHN STUART MILL, A Few Words on Non-intervention, in DISSERTATIONS 
AND DISCUSSIONS, POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL 157 (1867). 
 72. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DU CONTRAT SOCIAL OU PRINCIPES DU DROIT 
POLITIQUE (C.E. Vaughan ed., 1918) (1762).  
 73. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 43-46 (Henry Reeve trans., 
New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1899). 
 74. See JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE LAST OF THE MOHICANS (New York, Hurd & 
Houghton 1871) (1826). 
 75. See 1 HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN (Cambridge, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 
1897) (1854).  
 76. See HERMANN NIEDERMAYR, EDLE WILDE UND GRAUSAME BARBAREN: BEGEGNUNG 
UND UMGANG MIT DEM FREMDEN IM SPIEGEL LATEINISCHER TEXTE (2008). 
 77. MacDonald v Levy (1833) 1 Legge 39 (Austl.), available at http://www.law.mq.edu. 
au/research/colonial_case_law/nsw/cases/case_index/1833/macdonald_v_levy/. 
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territory practically unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or 
settled law, at the time when it was peacefully annexed to the 
British dominions. The Colony of New South Wales belongs to 
the latter class.78 
In the 1971 decision Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd., Justice Blackburn 
acknowledged: 
I am very clearly of the opinion, upon the evidence, that the 
social rules and customs of the plaintiffs cannot possibly 
dismissed as lying on the other side of an unbridgeable gulf. The 
evidence shows a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to 
the country in which the people led their lives, which provided a 
stable order of society and was remarkably free from the 
vagaries of personal whim or influence. If ever a system could 
be called “a government of laws and not of men”, it is shown in 
the evidence before me.79 
However, in that same case the court stated that since the aborigines 
never had an idea of property rights it was not possible that original 
property rights existed.80 This decision resulted in the Aboriginal Land 
Rights Act of 1976, which allowed the transfer of land rights to aborigines 
under special circumstances requiring a traditional relationship to the land 
and no existence of conflicting rights.81  
In the famous 1992 decision Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2), the High 
Court of Australia explicitly rejected the terra nullius doctrine, 
acknowledged the original existence of native titles, and held that the 
Meriam people were entitled to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment 
of the Murray Islands.82  
  
                                                                                                                 
 78. Cooper v Stuart (1889) 14 App. Cas. 286, 291 (Austl.). 
 79. Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd. [1971] 17 FLR 141, 267 (Austl.). 
 80. See id. at 273-74.  
 81. Jürgen Bröhmer, Grundlegende Entwicklungen des australischen 
Bundesverfassungsrechts, 60 JAHRBUCH DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART (JÖR) 
689, 693 (2012). 
 82. See Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.), available at http:// 
www.austlii.edu.au. 
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The High Court in Mabo (No. 2) recognized that international law had 
allowed occupation of territory under the doctrine of terra nullius as an 
effective tool to acquire sovereignty.83  
With the great voyages of European discoverers came the prospect of 
occupying new and valuable territories already inhabited. Territories were 
granted to the sovereigns of the respective discoverers provided that the 
discovery was confirmed by their occupation and the indigenous inhabitants 
were not organized in a political society. The sovereignty of the respective 
European nations was recognized over the territorial rights of "backward 
peoples" by applying the doctrine of terra nullis. 
Various justifications for the acquisition of sovereignty over the territory 
of "backward peoples" have been advanced. Some scholars see the benefits 
of Christianity and European civilization upon the natives as a justification 
from medieval times.84 Another justification first advanced by Vattel at the 
end of the eighteenth century was that Europeans had a right to cultivate 
occupied territories.85  
The theory of discovery depended on land without settled inhabitants or 
settled law. However, this was never the reality. Even in the vast Australian 
outback, the aborigines led their lives in an ordered society with a 
government of law.  
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Justice Marshall noted that the Cherokee 
Nation was a State capable of managing its own affairs and governing 
itself. He stated: 
They have been uniformly treated as a State from the settlement 
of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the 
United States recognize them as a people capable of maintaining 
the relations of peace and war; of being responsible in their 
political character for any violation of their engagements, or for 
any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by 
any individual of their community.86 
  
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. ¶¶ 33-34 (Brennan J., declaration). 
 84. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 
78-80 (1990). 
 85. See VATTEL, supra note 60, at 1, 7, 81. 
 86. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). 
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IV. The Contradictions in Johnson v. M’Intosh 
 In Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice Marshall used the theory of 
discovery to advance his argument. In doing so, he missed the background 
of the theory and its relationship with the ideas of the Christian-European 
family, civilization, and the doctrine of terra nullius. At the start of the 
decision he stated: 
On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of 
Europe were eager to appropriate to themselves so much of it as 
they could respectively acquire. Its vast extent offered an ample 
field to the ambition and enterprise of all; and the character and 
religion of its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering 
them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might 
claim an ascendency. The potentates of the old world found no 
difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample 
compensation to the inhabitants of the new by bestowing on 
them civilization and Christianity in exchange for unlimited 
independence.87 
Marshall then went on to use the discovery doctrine to explain the 
relationship between the different European “discover” states, as well as the 
relationship between the United States and other European states. He stated: 
But as they were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was 
necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and 
consequent war with each other, to establish a principle, which 
all should acknowledge as the law by which the right of 
acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regulated as 
between themselves. This principle was, that discovery gave title 
to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it 
was made, against all other European governments, which title 
might be consummated by possession. 
 The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the 
nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil 
from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. It was a 
right with which no Europeans could interfere. It was a right 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-73 (1823). 
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which all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which, 
by others, all assented.88 
Marshall followed with a logical breach lacking in explanation: “Those 
relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives, were 
to be regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no 
other power could interpose between them.”89 It is with these two sentences 
that he developed a title against the natives.  
The next step in his argumentation was to deny the property rights of the 
Indians. Marshall stated: 
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with 
a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use 
it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete 
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own 
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original 
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to 
those who made it.90  
Justice Marshall later realized Johnson v. M’Intosh had opened a 
Pandora’s Box. He tried to close the box eight years later with Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia in which he stated, “the Indians are acknowledged to 
have an unquestionable, and heretofore unquestioned right to the lands they 
occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our 
government.”91 One year later in Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall 
acknowledged that his construction in Johnson v. M’Intosh was wrong. He 
argued: 
This [discovery] principle . . . gave to the nation making the 
discovery, as its inevitable consequence, the sole right of 
acquiring the soil and making settlements on it. It was an 
exclusive principle, which shut out the right of competition 
among those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the 
previous rights of those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the 
right given by discovery among the European discoverers, but 
could not affect the rights of those already in possession, either 
as aboriginal occupants or as occupants, by virtue of a discovery 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 573. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 574. 
 91. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. 
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made before the memory of man. It gave the exclusive right to 
purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of the right of 
the possessor to sell.92 
And he continued: 
This soil was occupied by numerous and warlike nations, equally 
willing and able to defend their possessions. The extravagant and 
absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made on the sea coast, or 
the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate 
power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from 
sea to sea, did not enter the mind of any man. They were well 
understood to convey the title which, according to the common 
law of European sovereigns respecting America, they might 
rightfully convey, and no more. This was the exclusive right of 
purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell.93 
Interestingly, the theory of civilization is also discussed in Johnson v. 
M’Intosh. Marshall stated: 
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce 
savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was 
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of 
their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern 
them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as 
brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to 
repel by arms every attempt on their independence.94  
In M’Intosh, Marshall defends his opinion of the history of the 
colonization of North America.95 In doing so, he misses the historical 
practices of Europe, and later the United States, which are a central and 
decisive factor in international law.96 The practice of signing treaties with 
non-European communities represents a remarkable contradiction to the 
theory of discovery. Today the existence of these treaties is rarely 
acknowledged, usually found only in individual cases in the European 
international law literature.97 A reason for this lack of attention could be 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 516 (1832). 
 93. Id. at 517. 
 94. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590. 
 95. Id. at 574. 
 96. See HARTMUT SCHIEDERMAIR, EFFEKTIVE HERRSCHAFTSGEWALT UND 
RECHTSFÄHIGKEIT IM VÖLKERRECHT 638-39 (1984) [hereinafter SCHIEDERMAIR, EFFEKTIVE]. 
 97. See GREWE, EPOCHEN, supra note 24, at 638-46. 
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that a large number of the older treaty collections did not contain colonial 
treaties; however, in recent years the “Consolidated Treaty Series” takes 
account of virtually all of the colonial treaties.98 
A study of these treaties shows that the United States alone made nearly 
370 treaties with Indian Nations.99 The U.S. practice of dealing with Indian 
Nations through treaties did not change until a law passed on March 3, 1871 
explicitly prohibiting any future treaty making with Indian Nations.100  
From the initial discovery of America, Indians were regarded as fully 
sovereign nations.101 The fixing of boundaries between the colonies and the 
Indian Federations on the east coast and the acquisition of land were 
effected by agreements between the representatives of the tribes and those 
of the English Crown.102 The agreements were termed "treaties" and 
regarded as internationally binding.103 This was partly because the Indians 
had a fierce military, a fact illuminated by King Louis XIV describing not 
England, but the Iroquois Federation as being the most dangerous opponent 
of France in the New World.104 
The same picture emerges in Africa. Belgium, France, Germany, and 
Britain dealt with the African tribes on the basis of treaties and attempted to 
acquire contractual title to the land.105  
In the same manner, both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
signed numerous treaties with various communities in Southeast Asia 
particularly concerned with the cession of land.106  
                                                                                                                 
 98. See 2 THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES: SPECIAL CHRONOLOGICAL LIST 1648-
1920 (Clive Parry ed., 1984) [hereinafter PARRY].  
 99. 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES (1778-1883) (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904), 
available at http://digital.library.okstate.edu/Kappler/. In the treaties, the Indian communities 
were initially termed "Nations" and later "Tribes" or "Bands.”  See Dörr, supra note 45, at 496. 
 100. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 71 
(2012)). 
 101. See W. Coles Durham, Jr., Indian Law in the Continental United States: An 
Overview, 2 LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY: INTERNATIONALES JAHRBUCH FÜR 
RECHTSANTHROPOLOGIE 93, 94 (1987). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See FELIX COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 53 (Rennard Strickland et 
al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN 1982 ED.]; see also Bernd C. Peyer, Bürger – mehr oder 
weniger: Indianer und das Gesetz in den USA, in PETER R. GERBER, VOM RECHT: INDIANER 
ZU SEIN 103, 104 (1986). 
 104. See GEORG FRIEDERICI, DER CHARAKTER DER ENTDECKUNG UND EROBERUNG 
AMERIKAS DURCH DIE EUROPÄER 364-65 (2d ed. 1969). 
 105. See PARRY, supra note 98. 
 106. Id. 
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From the beginning it was clear the United States did not proceed from 
the premise that Indian territory could be occupied at will. The law of 
March 3, 1789 stipulated that the land and property of Indians could not be 
taken without their consent, except through just and legal wars to which 
Congress must give assent.107 In addition, section 4 of the first Non-
Intercourse Act of 1790 stated that no sale of land by an Indian or Indian 
community within the United States is valid, unless undertaken through a 
treaty with the United States.108 The very statement that only “just wars” 
may be conducted against Indians affirms their international law 
sovereignty by granting them combatant status. 
During and following the American War of Independence from Britain 
(1775-1783), the United States adopted the practice of entering into treaties. 
Because of the ongoing British-American hostilities, both sides attempted 
to attract the respective Indian communities and their military might. 
During and after the war, there were repeated armed conflicts between the 
United States and tribes allied with Britain — particularly in the northwest, 
such as near the Ohio border, as a result of continuing expansion — in the 
wake of which the borders were redefined by treaty and the Indians were 
gradually pushed westward.109  
After the War of 1812, in which the northwestern Indian tribes under 
Tecumseh prevented the United States from conquering Canada at the start 
of the war,110 the preeminence of the United States over the Indians was 
established in the Treaty of Ghent (1814).111 Still, the United States 
continued to deal with these communities through treaties, though they 
were increasingly used to dissolve Indian land rights. 
All the colonial treaties, which provide an argument in favor of 
classification under international law in both their form and substance, 
contradict the doctrine of free right of occupation. The doctrine of the free 
right of occupation and the legal concept of discovery justified retrospective 
treaty breaches, which became increasingly prevalent after the conclusion 
of European expansion in the second half of the nineteenth century.112 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See Dörr, supra note 45, at 496. 
 108. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 
1753 (2012)).   
 109. See generally GLENN TUCKER, TECUMSEH: VISION OF GLORY 55-73 (Russell & 
Russell 1973) (1956) (detailing the war on the Ohio Border, 1789-1795).  
 110. See id. 
 111. See Johnson v. M’Intosh 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 567 (1823); see also Treaty of 
Peace and Amity, U.S.-Brit., Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218. 
 112. FISCH, supra note 29, at 349-58. 
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In the decision Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall seemed to 
realize his historical explanation in Johnson v. M’Intosh was wrong. He 
stated: 
Fierce and warlike in their character, they might be formidable 
enemies, or effective friends. Instead of rousing their 
resentments, by asserting claims to their lands, or to dominion 
over their persons, their alliance was sought by flattering 
professions, and purchased by rich presents. The English, the 
French, and the Spaniards, were equally competitors for their 
friendship and their aid. Not well acquainted with the exact 
meaning of words, nor supposing it to be material whether they 
were called the subjects, or the children of their father in Europe; 
lavish in professions of duty and affection, in return for the rich 
presents they received; so long as their actual independence was 
untouched, and their right to self government acknowledged, 
they were willing to profess dependence on the power which 
furnished supplies of which they were in absolute need, and 
restrained dangerous intruders from entering their country; and 
this was probably the sense in which the term was understood by 
them. 
 Certain it is, that our history furnishes no example, from the 
first settlement of our country, of any attempt on the part of the 
Crown to interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians farther 
than to keep out the agents of foreign powers, who, as traders or 
otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances. The king 
purchased their land when they were willing to sell, at a price 
they were willing to take, but never coerced a surrender of them. 
He also purchased their alliance and dependence by subsidies; 
but never intruded into the interior of their affairs, or interfered 
with their self government, so far as respected themselves 
only.113 
At the end of the Johnson v. M’Intosh decision, Marshall conceded to the 
extravagant appearance of converting the discovery of an inhabited country 
into conquest, but “if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, 
and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; 
if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it 
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becomes the law of the land and cannot be questioned.”114 This is typical of 
Chief Justice Marshall; if he had no argument, he always claimed that the 
result was clear or unquestionable. 
Because of such treaties, the U.S. Supreme Court is still frequently 
involved in clarifying the legal position of Indians in the United States.115 
The Court proceeds from the premise that Indians within their own territory 
enjoy, in the same way as state entities, not only personal sovereignty over 
their members, but also territorial sovereignty over the land allocated to 
them.116 
In the view of the U.S. Supreme Court, these tribes are considerably 
more than private, voluntary organizations. Though Indians have derived 
such sovereign rights as granted to them by U.S. legislation and treaties, 
they also possess an inherent sovereignty.117 This continues to exist insofar 
as federal law or treaty does not explicitly withdraw the sovereign 
authority.118 These powers represent the residual authority of a previously 
unrestricted sovereignty, which in the view of the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Indian communities once enjoyed on their own territory.119 
Thus, relations between Indians and the United States still contain 
elements subject to international law.120 Today it cannot be said that 
indigenous peoples are regarded as having no sovereign rights within the 
United States. On the other hand, the Johnson v. M’Intosh decision was 
disastrous for the Indians as it was used to dispossess the Native Americans 
of their lands. 
This legal evaluation is no peculiarity of the United States. In Canada, 
the relationship between the Indians and the United Kingdom, subsequently 
Canada, is interpreted in a similar manner. In contrast to earlier rulings, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has partially adopted the rulings of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, working from the assumption that the Indians had an 
                                                                                                                 
 114. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591. 
 115. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS: TIME AND THE LAW (1987) (dealing 
with case law between 1959 and 1986, and detailing eighty rulings by the U.S. Supreme 
Court on Indian Law). 
 116. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). 
 117. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 139-49 (1982); United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978); see also WILKINSON, supra note 115, at 54-63. 
 118. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 313. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See Dörr, supra note 45, at 504.  
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inherent right to their own land.121 However, it remains unclear whether 
these rights were simply personal rights of the individual Indian, or whether 
the Indian communities were entitled to something in the nature of 
sovereignty rights.122 
In Central America, treaties were signed between the United Kingdom 
and Indian communities. As early as 1720, a formal treaty was made 
between Britain and the Mosquito, or Mesquito, Indians on the basis of full 
equality.123 In the course of disputes between Nicaragua and the U.K. the 
Treaty of Managua was signed between the U.K. and Nicaragua in 1860.124 
In this treaty, the U.K. recognized Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the entire 
territory of the Mosquito Indians without their consent.125 In return, 
Nicaragua granted the Indians a large measure of autonomy.126 When 
Nicaragua did not comply with these obligations, the U.K. objected to this 
treaty violation and the dispute was passed to the Austrian Kaiser Franz 
Josef for arbitration.127 The arbitration of July 2, 1881 ruled for Britain and 
came down in clear favor of Indian autonomy.128 In the arbitration ruling, it 
is stated that the Mosquito Indians maintained relations with the United 
Kingdom under international law.129 Only in 1860 was the previous 
protectorate relationship under international law replaced by a subjugation 
relationship under domestic law.130 In justification of its actions against the 
Indians, Nicaragua relied on the concept of civilization.131 Whilst this was 
not outright rejected in principle by the arbitration ruling, it was not 
accepted as justification for the poor treatment of the Indians, and exposed 
as a subterfuge.132  
                                                                                                                 
 121. See STEPHAN MARQUARDT, THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES OF CANADA AND THEIR 
RIGHTS UNDER CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 251 (1989); see also Guerin v. The Queen 
[1984], 2 S.C.R. 335 (Can.). 
 122. See MARQUARDT, supra note 121, at 262-67.  
 123. Convention Between Great Britain and Mosquito, U.K.-Mosquito, June 25, 1720, 31 
Consol. T.S. 235.  
 124. Treaty of Managua, U.K.-Nicar., Jan. 8, 1860, 121 Consol. T.S. 318.    
 125. Id. at 319. 
 126. Id. at 320. 
 127. See Award as to the Interpretation of the Treaty of Managua (U.K. v. Nicar.), 28 
R.I.A.A. 167 (1881), available at http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXVIII/167-184.pdf. 
 128. Id.; see also FISCH, supra note 29, at 394-99. 
 129. Award as to the Interpretation of the Treaty of Managua, supra note 127, at 173.  
 130. Id. at 174. 
 131. See id. at 175-76. 
 132. See id.   
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In a 1960 ruling on the dispute between Portugal and the Republic of 
India on transit rights over Indian territory,133 the International Court of 
Justice clearly showed it did not question the validity of colonial treaties in 
international law. In this dispute, Portugal was claiming rights arising from 
a treaty with the Marathen state of 1779.134 The International Court 
proceeded, as a matter of course, on the basis of recognizing the full legal 
status of both contracting signatories, and therefore regarded the 1779 
treaty as valid under international law.135 This is evidence of the fact that in 
state practice, the Indian and Southeast Asian communities were accepted 
into the international law community and were regarded by the European 
powers as able and willing to observe treaty rights and obligations.136 
In the International Court’s 1975 Sahara Report, it is clear that Spain 
didn’t even regard the Western Sahara as non-sovereign territory during 
Spanish colonization.137 On the contrary, Spain made agreements with the 
local tribes in order to acquire title in international law to the territory of the 
West Sahara.138 Thus, the theory that the Sahara territory was terra nullius 
was rightly rejected. The majority judgment stated: 
In the view of the Court, therefore, a determination that Western 
Sahara was a “terra nullius” at the time of colonization by Spain 
would be possible only if it were established that at that time the 
territory belonged to no-one in the sense that it was then open to 
acquisition through the legal process of “occupation”. Whatever 
differences of opinion there may have been among jurists, the 
State practice of the relevant period indicates that territories 
inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political 
organization were not regarded as terrae nullius. It shows that in 
the case of such territories the acquisition of sovereignty was not 
generally considered as effected unilaterally through 
“occupation” of terra nullius by original title but through 
agreements concluded with local rulers. On occasion, it is true, 
the word “occupation” was used in a non-technical sense 
denoting simply acquisition of sovereignty; but that did not 
signify that the acquisition of sovereignty through such 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 9 (Apr. 12).  
 134. Id. at 37. 
 135. Id. at 45. 
 136. See FISCH, supra note 29, at 37-39, 455-60. 
 137. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 38-43 (Oct. 16).  
 138. Id. ¶ 81, at 39. 
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agreements with authorities of the country was regarded as an 
“occupation” of a “terra nullius” in the proper sense of these 
terms. On the contrary, such agreements with local rulers, 
whether or not considered as an actual “cession” of the territory, 
were regarded as derivative roots of title, and not original titles 
obtained by occupation of terrae nullius.139 
V. Summary 
In taking account of these state practices, it cannot seriously be claimed 
that all overseas territories were regarded in the international law of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as non-sovereign or terra nullius 
because of the wild state of their inhabitants — in accordance with the 
theory of the civilized community. On the contrary, the treaty practices of 
the Europeans clearly shows that they regarded the Indian, Southeast Asian 
and African communities as having the will and ability to fulfill their treaty 
obligations.  
Initially the founding members of the international law community 
comprised only the Christian and later civilized nations, that is to say the 
European states and, following its establishment, the United States. 
However, during European expansion, the European powers and the United 
States recognized numerous non-European communities as powers capable 
of maintaining relations under international law. With this recognition, the 
Indian nations became a part of the international law community. They 
acquired the ability to act in international law by dint of recognition.140  
The doctrine of the non-sovereign territories, the “community of 
civilized nations” and the lack of international law sovereignty of the non-
European communities as well as the theory of discovery with the concept 
of civilization justified breaches of treaties and morally legitimized the 
actions of the Europeans and later the United States. However, from the 
start, this doctrine was at odds with state practice. The deciding factor in 
international law sovereignty was to what extent non-European 
communities were regarded as being willing and able to enter into and 
observe treaty relations. 
The question of what degree of civilization and recognition of law is 
required in order to affirm the existence of legal capacity in international 
law is not simply a historical problem — it is a constant theme in 
international law. Thus, it is not surprising that the philosophical question 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. ¶¶ 79, 80, at 39. 
 140. COHEN 1982 ED., supra note 103, at 39-40.  
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regarding what distinguishes the state from a band of robbers is repeatedly 
posed.  
Today, article 4, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter specifies that only those 
states willing and able to fulfill their obligations arising from the Charter 
may become members of the United Nations.141 The importance of this 
provision extends far beyond the question of UN membership. Examined 
correctly, this provision contains a definition of legal capacity to act, and 
thus of the state in the terms of international law.142 States are accordingly 
only such communities as are willing and able to fulfill their entire 
obligations in international law. The state, in this case, is defined as a legal 
condition, as it was by Christian Wolff, with the extremely problematic 
consequence that a minimum level of legality is indispensable to establish 
the quality of statehood. 
The exact minimum level of legality required is difficult to define. 
Despite some demurring opinions in the literature,143 Nazi Germany did not 
have its right to act as an entity in international law, because it failed to 
achieve a minimum level of legality.144 Cambodia was not excluded from 
the international law community during the reign of terror of the Khmer 
Rouge.145 This ambiguity makes sense in order to protect the validity of 
international law and continue the prohibition on the use of force.  
The problems that arise from the exclusion of large sections of the 
international community from international law are clearly illustrated by the 
theory of discovery, the idea of the community of civilized nations, and the 
doctrine of terra nullius. These doctrines were used in attempts to 
disenfranchise non-European peoples and to legitimize breaches of the 
colonial treaties. Conquest by law is a dark chapter of European and 
American history. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 141. U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1. 
 142. See SCHIEDERMAIR, EFFEKTIVE, supra note 96, at 640. 
 143. Cf., e.g., Hans Kelsen, The International Legal Status of Germany to Be Established 
Immediately upon Termination of the War, 38 AM. J. INT’L L. 689 (1944). 
 144. See Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme 
Authority by Allied Powers, art. 13, June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, available at http://avalon. 
law.yale.edu/wwii/ger01.asp. 
 145. See Theresa Klosterman, Comment, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth 
Commission in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late?, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 833, 850 
(1998). 
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